ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the career backgrounds of local government officials in provincial Environmental
Introduction
Previous research on China has focused on the institutional limitations of local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs). These include studies in Guangdong (Lo & Tang, 2006; Sinkule & Ortolano, 1995) , Shandong (Ma, 2000) , Sichuan (Van Rooij, 2003) , and Liaoning (Bauer, 2006) . It seems uniformly acknowledged that EPBs are often understaffed, underfunded, and lacking in the necessary formal power to implement many environmental tasks assigned them. What is implicit in these studies is that if these EPBs were granted the institutional capacity to function efficiently and authoritatively in their localities, then EPBs would be much more likely to achieve their environmental protection objectives. This paper evaluates the implementation capacity of EPBs through an alternative approach. It evaluates institutional capacity by analyzing the backgrounds of current provincial EPB heads and explains why some EPB heads are selected over others. 1 The EPB heads are often authoritative figures within the bureaus and have an overriding influence over the internal workings of bureaus' environmental protection efforts (Van Rooij, 2003) . However, the EPB heads are themselves only one small part of an intricate network of government agencies, which rely on inter-departmental coordination and consensus building to achieve their bureau objectives (Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995) . Bureau heads are promoted into their positions by provincial leaders and obey the explicit orders and implicit priorities of these leaders. As EPB heads are authoritative and influential figures within an EPB (Van Rooij, 2003; Bauer, 2006) , the institutional capacities, relative to each other, of provincial EPBs can be to a large thanks William Hobbs for excellent research assistance and Sarah Eaton, Thomas Johnson, Arthur Mol, and Ran Ran for valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. extent determined by the priorities and objectives of the current EPB heads. The overall capacities, or willingness, of the EPB heads to undertake strict environmental protection measures are heavily influenced by their relations to their superiors in the provincial government and their colleagues in other bureaus.
While previous research has analyzed leaders' backgrounds, they mainly study national and provincial level leaders, which include provincial Party secretaries and mayors (Li, 2000; Huang, 2002; Mei, 2009) Specifically, an analysis of EPB heads' biographical information helps to achieve four important objectives: 1) reveal the career patterns of provincial leading bureaucrats in charge of environmental policy implementation; 2) exhibit the professional networks of these bureaucrats; 3) assess how career backgrounds and professional networks influence the implementation capacity and independence of local EPBs; and 4) infer appointment preferences of provincial Party committees and organizational departments in charge of appointing provincial EPB heads.
The analysis of EPB departmental heads' career patterns and institutional backgrounds demonstrates the variety of non-environmental career backgrounds, concurrent affiliations and professional networks. The paper argues that EPB leaders are highly embedded in their locality and in the local Party and government organizations. This embeddedness is a double-edged sword. While it improves the implementation capacity of EPB leaders, it can also dilute environmental protection incentives. This implies that there is a delicate balance between professional networks that improve implementation capacity and relations that paralyze efforts to improve environmental protection in China. The study further shows that EPB leaders may be easily categorized by their career backgrounds. The distinct characteristics of these 'types' suggest that provincial leaders make important appointment decisions among clearly differentiated candidates. This may have implications for inferring appointment preferences of provincial leaders. The most desirable candidate for the EPB head position will likely be an official whose assumed networks and incentives will be favorably aligned with provincial priorities and with parochial interests of the provincial leaders. Appointing provincial leaders are more likely to opt for an EPB head with the strength to help them to meet their individual mandatory or 'hard' (ying xing 硬性) targets under the cadre responsibility system, amongst which provincial leaders identified some targets that are more difficult to meet than others. Thus, provincial leaders selecting the most able EPB head may not behave altruistically, but, ultimately, in their self-interest. While Shanxi, a province under external pressure to improve air pollution, selected a candidate with the skills and credentials to effectively implement environmental mandates, still-developing Inner Mongolia appointed a candidate who can balance economic growth and environmental protection concern. Interviews with local organization departments clarified how EPB heads get appointed and demonstrate the important role played by Party committees and organizational departments.
Interviews with EPB heads and lower-level EPB officials provided an understanding of the responsibilities assigned to EPBs and the overall institutional capacities to complete the implementation tasks. Field research in Shanxi also offered the opportunity to interview the provincial EPB head personally to analyze his career background and networks.
A number of constraints for data collection limit the analysis. First, the study only analyzes the biographies of 31 EPB heads in office as of 2011 as information on EPB directors in earlier years (i.e., their predecessors) was not available online or was incomplete. Another limitation is that the analysis only examines reported professional affiliations and links, which differ from the full extent of actual links because they do not reflect intertwined informal connections. Some salient information might be also oversimplified, misreported (e.g., formal educational training), or not publically available. In addition, the analysis compared career backgrounds of EPB heads appointed (i.e., the 'successful' candidates) as no data on alternative candidates considered (i.e., the 'unsuccessful' competitors) were available.
Additional interviews with the provincial leaders working in organizational departments and Party committees would be necessary to understand why particular EPB heads were picked among the pool of candidates and if and how personal interactions, informal reports, and candidate interviews influence appointment preferences. Moreover, this paper categorizes EPB heads as environmental, business, provincial government, or local government oriented, based on their career path and networks. Of course, an EPB head's orientation is not only shaped by previous work experience and professional ties, but also by a mix of personal motivation, ideological beliefs, values, career ambitions as well as external circumstances. Additional analysis is also needed to link EPB head's orientation and actual performance as EPB directors. Despite these shortcomings, to the author's knowledge, this is the first bibliographic database tracking the career trajectories of EPB heads and as such, this study serves as a platform for further research.
The next section introduces concepts and arguments relevant to understanding the career patterns of provincial leading bureaucrats in charge of environmental policy implementation. The paper then analyzes previous work experience, concurrent affiliations, and professional networks of provincial EPB heads, showing that environmental leaders are highly embedded in their locality. The paper concludes by highlighting possible implications of EPB heads' policy orientation and by pointing out possible implications for environmental policy implementation.
Previous Literature and the Assumptions of this Study
This research is based upon a number of assumptions drawn from previous research on the cadre management system and environmental governance in China. These assumptions are: (a) environmental protection law enforcement and policy implementation is flexible and there is ample scope for agency to shape policy outcomes; (b) the EPB head is an authoritative and personally influential figure within the provincial EPB; (c) provincial EPBs operate in a complex system which places them under the local People's Government and the Communist Party Committee and alongside other bureaus. This high level of bureaucratic fragmentation necessitates coordination and consensus building between these various bodies; and (d) career paths and institutional backgrounds determine the professional skills, networks, factional ties, and incentives of government leaders and bureaucrats. In the following sections, these assumptions are used to address the questions of: (1) what specific work experience, networks, and incentives do Chinese EPB heads have? and (2) number of studies highlight the existence of 'local protectionism' in China and argue that local governments place more priority on protecting their economic interests than they do on environmental goals (Van Rooij, 2006; Kostka & Hobbs, 2013) . While there has been recent progress in creating improved national environmental legislation (Xie, 2004; Stern, 2011) and increasing prioritization of environmental protection work and innovation (Li et al, 2011: 132; Wang, 1997: 23) aimed at ameliorating the effects of such protectionism, such problems continue. Some argue that this is because national laws may lack local legitimacy (Bardach& Kagan, 1982; Van Rooij, 2006) . Also, bureau leaders have long had substantial discretionary power in how they choose to punish violations of national laws (Davis, 1969) and this still holds true for environmental law. Environmental protection decisions lack internal and external checks and balances (Van Rooij, 2003) and therefore EPB heads, as the leader of the government bureau with primary responsibility for environmental protection, 2 have the opportunity and often the incentive to dilute stringent environmental regulations to satisfy local interests.
(b) Authority and Personal Influence of an EPB Head
Previous studies emphasize the importance of individual leadership at the provincial, municipal and county levels. Studying the Sichuan provincial EPB, Van Rooij emphasizes that "the EPB is a centralist institution, and that its leadership has a final (direct and/or indirect) influence on almost all (except for their own positions) major personnel decisions " (2003: 46) . Another field study in Liaoning attributes major environmental improvements in Benxi municipality to the interventions of a high profile and charismatic municipal EPB head who "contrasted sharply with former EPB Heads in Benxi, who had held little power" (Bauer, 2006: 37) . Benxi's powerful EPB head even managed to capture the attention of national leaders, which laid the path for a major local pollution reduction program (Bauer, 2006: 39) . These research findings allow us to characterize an EPB head as authoritative and influential within the EPB structure.
(c) Bureau Interdependence and People's Government and Communist Party Committee Authority
EPBs are dependent on the provincial authorities partly because provincial Party and government leaders have the authority over appointment of provincial EPB heads.
The appointment of a provincial EPB director requires the approval of a provincial Party committee as no cadre can be appointed, promoted, or removed without the agreement of a specific Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committee and each appointment is subject to the authorization of the relevant organization departments (Landry, 2008) . Thus, provincial Party committees and organization departments directly handle the appointments of EPB heads and, through their influence on personnel decision making, maintain "a firm grip on the EPB" (Van Rooji, 2003: 46 In addition to appointment control, there is also a high degree of fiscal and administrative interdependence between the EPB and other government agencies. For
EPBs to carry out their daily work and objectives, leading EPB officials depend on support from other departmental heads and local government leaders .
EPBs receive funding for staff and projects from the provincial/municipal government and EPB budgets are thus subject to approval from the provincial/municipal finance bureau (Bauer, 2006; Lo & Tang, 2006 Another county-level EPB head in Shanxi illustrates the financial dependence:
In 2011, we could not expand the local central heating area as planned because our municipality faced severe financial pressure this year and the limited financial resources went to other projects. We will apply for national and provincial subsidies but even if we get the money, we need to match it with municipal funding, which is difficult to get at the moment.
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Insufficient financial resources also hinder some local EPBs from investing in necessary monitoring equipment. An EPB head in a resource-rich municipality notes:
"We would like to control heavy metal pollution in waste water as we know that some companies pollute it but we cannot afford the monitoring equipment. We have pointed this out to the provincial leaders for many years but only got approval for it this year". 6 In such an environment of uncertainty many EPBs therefore need to actively cultivate cooperative relationships and coordinate with other key departments and local leaders. Sinkule and Ortolano's study shows how the Shenzhen EPB employed both formal and informal means to link with other departments. One such formal tactic employed by the EPB, used only in extreme circumstances, is direct appeal to the city mayor to settle a conflict between itself and another department. More commonly-used tactics are informal and consist of negotiation, bargaining, and consensus-building in order to influence other departments' actions (Sinkule & Ortolano, 1995: 153) .
(d) Appointment Decisions, Career Paths, Networks, Incentives
In addition to developing cooperative relationships with other departments and being locally embedded, awareness of underlying professional networks is also crucial for understanding EPBs' work and implementation capacities. It is for this reason that gaining an understanding of the career pathways of EPB heads is relevant to the study of localities' implementation capacity. Previous work has examined the career paths of leading government officials and tried to detect patterns in appointment and promotion decisions (Burns, 1987 (Burns, , 1994 Walder, 1995; Manion, 1985 Manion, , 1993 Landry, 2008; Shih et al, 2010; Shih et al, 2012) . While the true bases of personnel decisions remains something of a black box in China, formal criteria considered during appointment processes include qualification requirements-such as age, education and professional experience-as well as performance evaluation from previous positions, which evaluate cadres' political attitude and moral character. In these performance evaluations, cadre evaluation criteria such as 'both red and expert'
(youhong youzhuan 又红又专) or 'having both integrity and competence' (decai jianbei 德 才 兼 备 ) are often left purposely vague and are hard to match with operationalizable standards (Mei, 2009 ). This vagueness leaves ample room for appointing Party and government officials to define what characteristics of a candidate are desirable and which 'merits' are conducive for the organizational good (Tullock, 1965) . Appointment procedures are thus shaped by selectors' preferences and career incentives and the selection of particular candidates reveals something about the preferences of 'selectors' (Mei 2009 ). As such, the selection of a provincial EPB heads tells us something about the views of provincial Party and government leaders. A deputy head of an Organization Department explains the process through which EPB heads get appointed at the county-level:
First, local county cadres can fill in a democratic recommendation form to suggest suitable candidates for the EPB director position. Next, the [county] Party committee discusses and recommends one or multiple candidates from the recommended list. Afterwards, the [county] organization department picks one or more candidates based on their educational and professional background, administrative and management abilities, and assessment of individual integrity and behavior. We especially pay attention to administrative and management abilities gained during previous work positions because environmental expertise alone does not ensure that the candidate is also a good leader. As a next step, the county government officially announces the nominated candidate(s) and the standing committee of the county people's congress picks the final candidate through a vote. If a single candidate is nominated, a candidate needs to receive more than half of the votes; if multiple candidates are nominated, the candidate with most votes gets selected. Finally, the results will be shared with the municipal organization department. So long as the election was legal, the municipal organization department will approve the candidate. 7 The above quote highlights the importance of previous work experience in appointment decisions. Provincial leaders can pick between candidates with generalist or specialist/technocratic networks (Shih, 2008) . Generalist networks are those not limited to a particular issue area such as environment or economics, while specialized networks are much more limited to these areas. A candidate with generalist networks holds wide-ranging ties and relationships within the Party and government structures, both horizontally and vertically, while a candidate with specialist/technocratic networks holds ties vertically concentrated within a bureaucratic system (xitong 系统) (Shih, 2008) .
Many informal selection criteria and 'soft factors' also influence appointment decisions. Li's (2010) empirical analysis of the provincial secretaries and mayors reveals that career promotions based on family ties (largely the domain of princeling, known as taizi 太子) or on patron-client relations (personal assistants, known as mishu 秘书) continue to be prevalent in China. Other studies have emphasized the importance of factional ties in Chinese politics formed on the basis of being born in the same province (tongxiang 同乡), attending the same school (tongxue 同学) and sharing common work experience (tongshi 同事), with the latter being the focus of this study (see for example, Li, 1994; Pye, 1995; Shih 2008; Hillman, 2010; Shih et al, 2010 Table 1 , nearly all EPB heads are nearing retirement, which is mandatory at the age of 60 in China, and are likely to have developed large professional networks over their careers.
From Table 1 , we see that most EPB heads claimed to have 4-year college degrees or higher, and several held Ph.D. degrees. As is often the case for Chinese bureaucrats, many of the EPB heads received degrees or professional training while in the civil service. Their academic fields are diverse but the majority of EPB leaders studied engineering, economics, and management. Strikingly, just three leaders majored in environmental sciences (EPB head in Tibet) or law (EPB heads in Guizhou and Sichuan). Table 1 here > Figure 1 shows the ages of EPB heads at the time of their appointments to their current positions and their average tenure times in office. The average age of appointment for current EPB heads is 47.6. 23 EPB directors (74%) had spent 4 years or less in their position, 2 directors (7%) had spent between 5-6 years, while a minority of EPB directors (19%) has served 7-9 years, and none more than 9 years. Changing EPB leadership at four-year intervals affects environmental policy implementation and regulation in numerous ways. Short tenure cycles can result in leading officials prioritizing short-term projects that deliver tangible results within their own tenure over projects with a longer time-frame (Eaton and Kostka, 2012) .
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Therefore, newly appointed EPB heads might have a strong interest in selecting environmental projects that will bear fruit quickly and tacitly sideline policies with a longer time to maturity. For instance, EPB leaders may opt to temporarily shut pollution-intensive companies to fulfill annual sulfur dioxide targets while putting off the more difficult tasks of either closing down the business permanently or developing long-term solutions, such as offering training or devising incentive mechanisms for technological advancements. High turnover in EPB leadership can also frustrate environmental policy implementation in more prosaic ways since newly appointed EPB heads, the majority of whom are not familiar with environmental regulations and policies, must spend considerable time in getting to know the lay of the land, which can result in damaging discontinuity in environmental initiatives (Eaton & Kostka, 2012) . Finally, short tenures of EPB directors also offer provincial leaders more frequent chances to appoint replacements, thereby enhancing the political control of organization departments and Party committees (Huang, 2002; Landry, 2008) .
Career Paths and Institutional Backgrounds
This section summarizes the previous positions and career backgrounds of EPB heads, respectively. 10 For example, the Tibet EPB head began his career as a researcher and aid worker in the environmental field before joining the civil service as the deputy head of the Tibet EPB. From Table 3 , we see Three EPB heads worked for enterprises in heavy industry (iron and steel, metallurgy, and chemicals), which could be especially useful work experience for an EPB head.
For example, the Jiangxi EPB head worked his entire career in a provincial chemical SOE, beginning as a factory assistant and eventually rising to chairman of the board.
The Gansu EPB director also spent the majority of his career in an enterprise, rising from technician to deputy CEO. The high share of EPB heads with previous work experience in SOEs is partly the result of organizational departments' control over personnel appointments across SOEs and government and Party organizations, making cross-postings easier and more widespread.
< Insert Figure 2 here >

Concurrent Affiliations and Cross-Postings
Of the 31 provincial EPB profiles analyzed here, seven EPB heads list outside affiliations and cross-postings on their CVs (Table 4) . Three EPB heads hold National Table 4 here >
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How to Interpret Previous Work Experiences and Career Backgrounds
This section addresses the question: how do the experiences, networks, and incentives of EPB heads influence the implementation capacity and independence of provincial EPBs? As the guanxi and network ties of an EPB head from his or her previous work experience may shape the incentives of EPB heads, these links and networks can be used to assign 'types' to each of the provincial EPB heads. Each type can be inferred to come with a possible orientation or slant towards the interests of his corresponding networks and factional ties.
As previously stated, these 'types' are based on the career backgrounds of EPB heads, most of whom spent the majority of their careers working in a particular area. 'provincially-oriented' for those bureaucrats who spent most of their careers in provincial governments, Party committees, or non-economic provincial bureaus;
'locally-oriented' for bureaucrats with careers in local government; and 'businessoriented' for career economic bureaucrats and SOE managers. Figure 3 presents the different career background categories.
< Insert Figure 3 here >
If existing networks based on career backgrounds influence EPB implementation capacities and priorities, then the selection of a provincial EPB head with a certain background can have a significant impact on local environmental protection. Since EPB heads can be relatively easily categorized by their work backgrounds, we can infer that provincial leaders seem to prefer particular types of politically-or economically-embedded officials when considering bureaucrats for promotion to EPB head. In the appointment process, provincial leaders can be expected to weigh the benefits of EPB head candidates' professional networks, skills, and incentives. Given limited available information on the candidates under consideration, provincial leaders will likely consider a candidate's profile carefully and initially use a candidate's career background, institutional affiliations, and previous performance evaluations as an indicator for their preferences and abilities. Career paths can also convey a great deal of information to the appointing officials on the candidate's professional networks, factional ties, skills, and incentives. As argued below, the 'best' candidate may not, in all cases, be the person with the greatest ability and credentials but rather be the person who best supports the political position of the appointer. The following section introduces the characteristics of these EPB head orientation categories and explains how each category of background may influence EPB implementation capacities and priorities in different ways.
Environmentally-oriented EPB Heads
Environmentally-oriented leaders are departmental heads who were promoted entirely 
Provincially-oriented EPB Heads
Provincially-oriented EPB heads spent the majority of their careers at the Provincial 
Locally-oriented EPB Heads
Locally-oriented leaders refer to EPB heads that spent the majority of their career working in county and municipal governments and agencies. Many officials in this cohort of EPB leaders worked most of their career in one or two localities before being promoted to the post of provincial EPB head. They are likely to retain tight links to their home localities. These ties likely provide a platform for informal feedback, which may improve provincial implementation polices. Of course, such cosy relationships might also result in favoritism and exception-granting. Lacking necessary networks and influence at the provincial level, locally-oriented leaders might also be less effective in gaining buy-ins from other provincial players and enterprises.
Beyond these considerations, during their many years spent at the local level, these leaders likely develop a political sense of how to balance competing priorities in the policy implementation process. This is particularly relevant to environmental protection. The ambitious approach to environmental protection in national and provincial policies and the pragmatic economic and social concerns of government agents and business interests at the local level make implementation of these policies especially contentious. Awareness of local implementation practices and knowledge about existing policy loopholes gives these leaders an advantage when enforcing environmental mandates that are highly dependent on municipal support. A number of studies have highlighted the Chinese Communist Party's ability to select government and Party leaders in a rational manner (Burns, 1987 (Burns, , 1994 Huang, 2002; Manion, 1985; Walder, 1995) . The findings of these studies indicate that the selection of bureau leaders is rarely random or haphazard. Candidates are selected through a rigorous evaluation process which considers a wide number of factors, such as past work experience and performance. The 'best' candidate is not necessarily the candidate who will most thoroughly enforce environmental regulation laws or even achieve the most progress in environmental protection. Provincial leaders and organization departments, when appointing a provincial EPB director, consider both overall provincial preferences and personal incentives. From the possible typologies, provincial leaders will need to select one 'type'. The most desirable candidate for the EPB head position will likely be an official whose assumed networks and incentives suggest to provincial leaders that, under the new leadership, EPB's practices will be favorably aligned with provincial priorities and with parochial interests of the provincial Party secretary and mayor. The implications of these preferred backgrounds are examined in the remainder of this section.
Business-oriented EPB Heads
Provincial Priorities and Cadre's Career Incentives
When assessing bureaucrats for promotion to EPB head, provincial leaders will consider the overall provincial context and weigh potential trade-offs, balancing considerations of the need for economic development and the complexity of environmental pollution problems. Provincial governments have different economic and environmental priorities, depending on the province's level of economic development (rich/poor), the level and complexity of environmental pollution (high/low) and the required level and type of implementation (locally/provincially; coordinated/uncoordinated). Provincial leaders may therefore seek out different types of environmental leadership and appoint a candidate who balances a certain mix of environmental or business expertise, provincial or local networks, and high or low career ambition. These factors may heavily influence the capacity of an EPB head, and consequently strengthen or weaken the environmental protection institution itself.
In addition to considerations related to the overarching provincial interest, personal preferences and career incentives of provincial Party secretaries and mayors are at least equally important, if not more so. A number of personal incentives may influence appointment decisions, including potential of appointees to affect a leader's ability to meet targets, receive annual bonuses, and be promoted, along with personal favoritism, but the most important of these is the desire for promotion. Rationally, cadres will evaluate candidates based on whether they help them to advance, or at least safeguard, their own careers. Council. Prior to joining the civil service, Shanxi's EPB head was in the military and also worked as a television editor and journalist. He claimed to use his military experience to get 'respect' from other leaders and environmental protection workers.
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As for the media experience, within the Shanxi EPB, he was known for being particularly adept at handling media attention and obtaining media coverage for the province's significant environmental progress since his appointment in 2006. 13 Over the last six years in office, this 'strong' EPB head made substantial progress in reducing emissions, particularly SO2 emissions, and enforcing overall environmental protection standards, partly because he had a clear mandate from the provincial government following the National Development and Reform Commission's introduction of hard targets in emissions reduction and energy savings for provincial leaders. One of his first actions as a newly appointed EPB director was to temporarily revoke some county EPBs' right to conduct environmental evaluations (quyu xianpi 区域限批) to punish them for turning a blind eye to coal and coking operations without approved environmental impact reports. 14 This drastic measure effectively blocked counties' ability to approve new industrial projects. This was the first time a provincial EPB director had made use of this severe penalty and the ensuing media glare put the affected county leaders under extreme pressure (Eaton and Kostka, 2012) and was "an effective warning to other counties". 15 The EPB head also devised new incentive mechanisms to motivate local EPB heads by, for example, promising a financial award from the provincial EPB to the municipality that could first be removed from the list of the nation's most polluted cities. Yangquan municipality was first to clear its name, in 2008, and was awarded 2 million RMB by the province. By contrast, in Shanxi the provincial EPB head widely advertised the 'cut electricity, cut water' (duandian duanshui 断电断水) policy that could be implemented because the provincial EPB head had successfully coordinated with local state-owned electricity and water companies to cut off a company's access to utilities.
Candidate Selection and Selection Preferences: Provincial-level Municipalities
In contrast to a somewhat prevalent government-enterprise coordination approach to policy implementation in provinces and autonomous regions, there is evidence that urban provincial-level municipal leaders in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and
Chongqing prefer EPB candidates with environmental expertise or specialized networks to other non-economic bureaus. All four centrally administered municipalities appointed EPB leaders with careers in environmental protection or non-economic bureaus such as labor and social security, urban planning, or construction. In addition, EPB heads in all four municipalities are young, with leaders in Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing being appointed to their positions at the age of 45 or younger. Since younger EPB heads are likely to have smaller networks, and EPB heads with environmental protection or non-economic bureau backgrounds will have backgrounds which complement EPB work, it suggests that provincial-level municipal leaders prioritize environmental expertise and networks to other provinciallevel departments over a business network-based implementation capacity of EPBs.
Provincial-level municipal leaders may also prefer a relatively independent, professionally skilled EPB head.
Conclusion
This paper has examined career backgrounds and institutional backgrounds of local government officials in provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in China.
EPB leaders' career backgrounds differ vastly, ranging from environmental bureaucrat, SOE business manager, political strategist, to implementers, despite EPB heads assuming seemingly similar environmental protection and law enforcement tasks. Based on their career backgrounds and their associated networks, EPB leaders fall into the following four typologies, and are nearly evenly split among them:
environmentally-oriented, business-oriented, policy-setting/provincially-oriented, and implementation/locally-oriented EPB leaders. The analysis of EPB heads' career backgrounds shows that only one fourth of provincial EPB heads were promoted within the EPB, while the remaining three-fourths came from positions outside the environment field. These findings have implications for inferring the unique characteristics of a province's EPB leadership and the implementation capacities of provincial EPBs.
The distinct characteristics of these different 'types' of EPB leaders show that provincial leaders make important appointment decisions among clearly differentiated
candidates. This may have implications for inferring appointment preferences of provincial leaders. Provincial mayors and Party secretaries and leaders in the provincial Organization Department, when appointing EPB heads, balance different overall provincial and personal preferences. A certain candidate 'type' and career background might be more suitable to meet these different preferences. When assessing bureaucrats for promotion to EPB head, provincial leaders will consider the overall provincial context and weigh potential trade-offs, balancing considerations on the need for economic development, the complexity of environmental pollution, and required implementation practices. Rationally, provincial leaders select an EPB head who will act in the best interest of the province as a whole as perceived by these leaders, while also helping provincial leaders to bolster their own political careers.
This paper further argued that a leader's local networks and relationships likely improve the implementation capacity of EPBs, but also at times weaken incentives to strictly enforce environmental protection laws and policies. This implies that there is a delicate balance between networks which advance implementation capacity and those which paralyze environmental protection efforts in China. EPB heads that are well connected to other key departments and enterprises are more likely to be successful in creating cross-sectoral and cross-departmental coalitions. However, the professional networks which may improve environmental protection capacity in a province through coordination and consensus-building also further decrease the already limited autonomy of local EPBs. Highly embedded leaders with limited independence may place priority on commercial, economic, or political interests over environmental protection, and turn a blind eye to polluting enterprises or illicit practices by other government bureaus. Notes: * Categorization based on analysis of three previous work experiences. Policysetting/provincially-oriented category combines leaders with government and non-economic provincial bureau careers. The business-oriented category combines leaders with careers in provincial economic bureaus and enterprises.
